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Evidence--Offers of Compromise Versus Admissions
Against Interest
D contracted orally with P to design the mechanical and electrical
work for a building project. P was to be paid on a commission basis.
At first, D was satisfied with P's work. Later, however, D became
dissatisfied when he learned that the budget for the building project
would not permit many of the proposed specifications set forth in
P's drawings. D maintained he did not owe P anything, resulting in
P's bringing an action for services rendered. It was disclosed at the
trial that D had written P's attorney stating that he felt that P should
be compensated for the work he had done in preparing the drawings,
but not to the extent of P's billing. Accordingly, the letter further
informed P's attorney that D had requested a payment of $1,000.00
be made to P. Significantly, the near closing lines of the letter
read as follows: "I am sure that if we get together on my next visit
to Wheeling, we can settle this problem amicably." The letter was
admitted into evidence over D's objections. Judgment was entered
for P on the jury's verdict. D's motion for a new trial, on the ground
that the letter related to an unaccepted offer of compromise and
was for that reason inadmissible, was overruled. D appealed. Held,
affirmed. The letter in question was merely an expression of D's
opinion and was in no way connected with an offer for compromise.
Consequently, the letter was admissible as an admission against
interest.' Shaeffer v. Burton, 155 S.E.2d 884 (W. Va. 1967).
The line between offers of compromise and admissions against
interest is a hazy demarcation at best. Nonetheless, it is a line that
must be defined so that future negotiations leading to private adjustments of conflicting claims may be properly conducted. If one
believed each of his statements volunteered in private negotiations
could be used as admissions of liability in future litigations, such
negotiations would rarely produce agreement or even occur. The
decision in Shaffer reflects the position of the West Virginia
court as to the differentiation between offers of compromise and
admissions against interest.
' It should be noted initially that there is a distinct difference between
admissions against interest and declarations against interest. The main difference is that so called declarations against interest refer to statements made
by one who is not a party to the proceeding whereas admissions against
interests are statements made by a party-opponent. Both are exceptions to
the hearsay rule. For a more thorough explanation of the matter see 5
WiMoRE, EVrDENCE § 1455 (3d ed. 1940); 58 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1944).
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Courts unanimously hold that offers of compromise are inadmissible in evidence. 2 But this uniformity in result is deceptive in that
the reasons courts give for this conclusion are fundamentally different.3 Therefore, it will contribute to the clarification of the question as to what constitutes compromise offers if one considers the

various theoretical foundations for their exclusion.
The majority of courts predicate the exclusion of offers to com-

promise upon a relevancy theory.4 If the statement is such that
its reception into evidence would affect the apparent probabilities of
some issue of fact in the particular case, and would thereby enhance
the search for the truth of the matter, the statement is relevant.5
But, the general rule is that a statement that is an offer neither admits

nor ascertains any liability and is therefore irrelevant. 6 In short,
the offer is only illustrative of the offeror's desire to avoid litigation.'
The minority of courts base their decision of inadmissibility of
offers on a privilege theory.' Since public policy favors the settlement of disputes without invoking the aid of the overburdened courts,
the communications that could effectuate such settlements are
privileged. 9 As a result, these communications are inadmissible into
evidence. Under this theory, the probative value of the offer is
not important; rather if these negotiations were not protected the
24 WIcMoBE, EVIDIENCE § 1062 (3d ed. 1940); Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d
13 (1967).
3 For a complete discussion of the various reasons courts advance for
excluding offers of compromise from evidence
see Bell, Admissions Arising
out of Compromise-Are They Irrelevantp, 31 TEXAS L. REv. 239 (1953).
4 E.g., Esser v. Brophey, 212 Minn. 194, 3 N.W.2d 3 (1942). This case
is particularly significant in that it is one of the few decisions that expressly
acknowledges the different theories for excluding offers to compromise from
evidence. Generally, one can ascertain a case s theoretical basis for the
exclusion of offers to compromise only by carefully examining its particular
language. Wigmore treats the matter of excluding some statements as offers of
compromise as completely a matter of relevancy. 4 WiGMoRE EVDENCE §
1061 (3d ed. 1940). For discussions suggesting offers should be treated as
privileged communications, see McCoanncK, EvIDENCE § 76, at 157 (1954);
Bell, Admissions Arising out of Compromise-Are They Irrevelant?, 31 TEXAs

L. REv.
239 (1953).
5

James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REv. 689
(1941).
6
Esser v. Brophey, 212 Minn. 194, 3 N.W.2d 3 (1942); Sanhorn v.
Neilson,
4 N.H. 501 (1825).
7
fBrickell v. Shawn, 175 Va. 373, 9 S.E.2d 330 (1940). But, it may be
argued that offers of compromise "are more apt to be made in cases in which
the party making them is conscious that the cause of his adversary is well
founded than in the opposite cases." Rideout v. Newton, 17 N.H. 71, 73
(1845); cf. McCoRIcx, EVIIENCE, § 76 (1954).
8 34 MicH. L. REv. 524 (1936).
9
Hiltpold v. Stem, 82 A.2d 123 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1951); Eckhardt
v. Harder, 160 Wash. 207, 294 P. 981 (1931).
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possibility of private compromise would be slight indeed."0 This
reasoning crystallizes in the opinion that a person is entitled to
pursue a course that would result in compromise without the danger
of being prejudiced in the event his efforts should fail." The focus
of purpose under the privilege theory then, is directed to the policy
of preserving an atmosphere in which private settlements may
flourish.
The English courts are the primary exponents of a third theory
for excluding offers of compromise; this is commonly called the
contract theory. 2 According to this theory, the essential question is
whether or not the offeror stipulated that his statment was to be kept
confidential. In order to signal the offeror's intent to keep the communication confidential, the most common practice is to preface
the communication with the words "without prejudice." The effect
of the saving words "without prejudice" is to render the statement
inadmissible into evidence. 3
It should be noted that the relevancy, privilege and contract
theories are merely reasons for excluding offers of compromise from
evidence; but before the reasons for excluding compromise offers
become important it is only logical that one must first determine
what statements will constitute offers of compromise. That is, even
though a discussion of the theories involved will enhance one's
understanding of the general rule of excluding offers of compromise,
as a practical matter, the theories operate simply as rationales for
The court's language in Hiltpold v. Stern, supra at 126, aptly explains
the essence of the riviege theory for excluding offers for compromise:
A mere offer of compromise is to be protected because a party to
a controversy is permitted in the interest of peace to tender such
terms as to him shall seem proper, and if rejected by the other party
it would be unfair to make use of it as an admission of liability.
Compare this statement concerning the "fairness" of excluding offers of
compromise with the decision reached in Sanborn v. Neilson, 4 N.H. 501
(1825).
10
Bartels v. Schwake, 153 Minn. 251, 190 N.W. 178 (1922). Discussing
offers of compromise the court said at 252, "The law favors the settlement
of disputed claims without litigation, and to encourage such settlements will
not permit either party to use offers of settlement made by the other as
evidence of an admission of liability." In Patrick v. Crowe, 15 Colo. 543,
554, 25 P. 985, 989 (1891) the court explained that, "If parties can be
compelled . . . to detail offers made for the purpose of settling matters in
dispute to avoid litigation, certainly no prudent person would feel safe in
offering any concessions for the purpose of bringing about compromise."
1 Eckhardt v. Harder, 160 Wash. 207, 211, 294 P. 981, 983 (1931).
124 WiGoRE, EvIDENCE § 1061 (3d ed. 1940); 34 Micn. L. REv. 524,
526 (1936).
13 Cf. McCoMtmcK, EVIDENCE § 251, at 541 (1954).
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exclusion and do not serve as criteria in the particular case. 4 As a
result, certain tests have been employed to assist the courts in their
initial differentiation between offers of compromise and admissions against interest.
The crucial test to distinguish offers of compromise from admissions against interest is to determine the intent of the particular

individual making the overture."5 Practically, however, the party's

intentions are operative only to the extent that they are manifest.
Therefore, the courts have devised certain objective standards to
evaluate the particular individual's intentions. 6 The most common
standard is to look to the form of the statement. Specifically, if the
statement is in the form of a hypothetical assertion and is conditional
in its terms on effecting a settlement, the statement is an offer of

compromise. 7 Conversely, if the statement is explicit and absolute
in its terms it is an admission against interest.

The determination of the party's intent to make an offer of compromise is not limited to an examination of the statement itself. The
form of the statement is to be considered in light of all the surrounding circumstances. First, there must have been an actual dispute
between the parties at the time the particular overture was made. 8
14 This becomes even more obvious when one considers that in many
cases the theories are not mutually exclusive. Often one finds a court employing concurrently the privilege and relevancy theories, for example, without
acknowledging either as theories, or as separate rationales. E.g., T. M. Deal
Lumber Co. v. Jones, 137 Kan. 480, 21 P.2d 933 (1933).
15 People v. Forster, 23 Cal. Rptr. 582, 58 Cal. App. 2d 257, 373 P.2d
630 (1962); Hunter v. Totman, 146 Me. 259, 80 A.2d 401, (1951); Colbum
v. Groton, 66 N.H. 151, 28 A. 95 (1890); Hendrickson v. Meredith, 161 Va.
913, 170 S.E. 602 (1933); Chesapeake and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Stock, 104 Va.
97, 51 S.E. 161 (1905).
The court in Colburn v. Groton, supra, presents an excellent discussion of
the law concerning the exclusion of offers of compromise from evidence.
16The
question of intent and whether or not the statement will be
admissible as an admission against interest is to be determined by the trial
court as a preliminary question of fact. Hunter v Totnan, 146 Me. 259, 268,
80 A.2d 401, 406, (1951); Gagne v. New Haven Rd. Constr. Co., 87 N.H.
163, 175 A. 818, 821 (1934). But, if the evidence is disputed as to whether
a fact was admitted as true or whether the statement was made with the
intention of effectuating a compromise, the question may be submitted to the
jury with instructions to disregard it if it is the latter. Colburn v. Groton,
151, 28 A. 95 98 (1890).
66 N.H.
' 7 Brown v. Hysiop, 153 Neb. 669, 677, 45 N.W.2d 743 748 (1951);
Keatley v. Hanna Chevrolet Co., 121 W. Va. 669, 675, 6 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1939);
Lovett v. West Virginia Central Gas Co., 73 W. Va. 40, 45, 79 S.E. 1007,
1009 (1913). See 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 285 (1964).
" Wartell v. Novograd, 49 R.I. 191, 141 A. 461 (1928). An offer to
pay an admitted liability does not come within the general rule excluding
offers of compromise. Firestone Fire and Rubber Co. v. Hillow, 65 A.2d
338 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1949) (claim for damage to car advanced by a
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Similarly, one is to consider whether or not there was an actual threat
of litigation. 9 In this respect, the time of the statement is just as important as its form. Moreover, some courts have asked whether or
not a definite amount of money was offered at the time the statement
was made.2" Certainly an offer of a definite amount in order to
effectuate a settlement of an existing dispute would indicate an intention to compromise. It appears that no one criterion is to be considered controlling; rather, each is to be examined and considered
in light of the entire situation existing between the parties.
Once a statement has been characterized generally as an offer of
compromise and, as such, inadmissible into evidence, it does not
necessarily follow that each segment of the entire statement is likewise
inadmissible. Independent statements of fact, although encompassed
in an offer of compromise, are admissible in evidence as admissions
against interest.2 The weight of authority takes this position.2 2
This, of course, may be just another way of saying independent facts
are not offers of compromise. But, failure to realize this gradation
could cause confusion in cases where one finds a court holding
generally that a statement is inadmissible because it is an offer to
compromise, while at the same time admitting into evidence parts
of the same statement. The public policy favoring the private settlement of disputes is out-weighed by the stronger public policy which
requires that material issues of fact be determined by the greatest
amount of relevant nonprejudicial evidence.2 3
The court in Shaeffer made the important distinction between reasons or theories for excluding offers of compromise and the general
tests to be used to determine whether a statement is in fact an offer.
Although it did not recognize them as such, it acknowledged both the
bailor against a parking station; defendant's agent offered to pay in full less
salvage value); McComas v. Clements, 137 Kan. 681, 21 P.2d 895 (1933)
(after car collision, defendant at scene of accident said he would take care
of any bills).
,9 E.g., Brown v. Hyslop, 153 Neb. 669, 676, 45 N.W.2d 743, 748 (1951).
20
Id.; cf. Gagne v. New Haven Rd. Constr. Co., 87 N.H. 163, 168, 175
A. 818, 821 (1934).
21 Hendrickson v. Meredith, 161 Va. 913, 170 S.E. 602 (1923); Keatley
v. Hanna Chevrolet Co., 121 W. Va. 669, 6 S.E.2d 1 (1939); Parkersburg
and Marietta Sand Co. v. Smith, 76 W. Va. 246, 85 S.E. 516 (1915).
22 See Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 13 (1967); 29 Am. Jun. 2d Evidence § 630

(1967); 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 287 (1964).

23 Gagne v. New Haven Rd. Constr. Co., 87 N.H. 163, 168, 175 A. 818,
821 (1934).
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privilege and relevancy theories as the reasons for excluding compromise offers from evidence. 24 Without considering either the
privilege or relevancy theories as controlling, it applied the tests to
characterize the letter as either an offer or admission.
The court applied many of the standard tests to make this distinction: (1) whether or not the statement was in the form of a
hypothetical assertion; (2) whether or not the statement was a part
of an offer; and (3) whether the statement was made for the purpose
of settlement or compromise.
The court's consideration of D's purpose for sending the letter to
P's attorney was significant. The statement in the letter concerning
the possibility of future settlement if the parties were to "get together" was dismissed by the court as merely an opinion of D. Thus
the court seemed to be drawing a fine line indeed by differentiating
offers of compromise and opinions. Significantly, this was an unnecessary distinction for the court to make. That is, assuming the
statement concerning an amicable settlement was an offer to compromise, the admission by D that he owed P some amount would
still have been admissible under the general rule that an admission
of liability is admissible into evidence even though it is part of an
offer of compromise.2"
The theories of exclusion provide merely rallying points for
future argument. Presently, however, in West Virginia one would
be well advised to give more attention to the particular tests employed by the court. Moreover, it would be prudent to frame any
overtures for compromise in the form of hypothetical assertions
with definite reference to settlement negotiations.
Thomas Ryan Goodwin

24

The pertinent language is:

The rule [for excluding offers] is based upon public policy
which favors the settlement of disputed claims out of court and
the courts treat such offer of compromise by a party as an effort to
obtain peace rather than as an admission of liability or of the
validity of the claim of the other party. Shaeffer v. Burton, 155
S.E.2d 884, 891 (W. Va. 1967) (emphasis added).
The first part of the sentence contains the public policy concept inherent
in the privilege theory; the last half of the sentence explains why such offers
are of no probative value and therefore irrelevant.
25 E.g., Brown v. Hyslop, 153 Neb. 669, 45 N.W.2d 743 (1951).
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